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HEGEL'S DIALECTIC AND THE MOTION OF MOTION
A Comparative Study of Hegel's Dialectical
Philosophy and Aristotle's Consideration
of the Motion of Motion in Book V of the Physics

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
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James Donaldson, Ph. Lic.



Errata

1. Page 25 is not missing; page 26 follows immediately on page 24
2. Page 39 and 40 are followed by pages 39a and 40a in this order:
page 39, 40, 39a, 40a

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HEGEL'S DIALECTIC AND THE NOTION OF MOTION

The problem of this thesis is concerned with a universal aspect of Hegel's Dialectic in so far as it contains Motion of motion. Although somewhat recondite in the writings of Hegel, the notion of motion found in the Dialectic concerns the passage from one triad to another. The triad, composed of thesis or affirmation, antithesis or negation of the affirmation, and synthesis of the affirmation and negation, that is, return to the original affirmation through negation of the negation, shows itself as motion simply. But because this motion terminates directly in another thesis which is the result, as Hegel terms it, or terminus ad quem of this first motion, the Dialectic reveals itself as motion which terminates in motion. The reason is that the thesis of the new triad reveals itself as the first moment, as Hegel terms it, of an ensuing antithesis and synthesis, which is, as was the first synthesis, a motion. The net effect, as Hegel himself states in an important Zusatz at the end of his first subsection of section one of the Logic, is a succession of motions.

"Wir hatten zunächst das Sein und als dessen Wahrheit ergab sich das Werden; diese bildete den Uebergang zum Dasein, als dessen Wahrheit wir die Veränderung erkannten. Die Veränderung aber zeigte sich in ihrem Resultate als das der Beziehung auf Anderes und den Uebergang in dasselbe entnommene Fürsichsein, welches Fürsichsein dann endlich, in den beiden Seiten seines Processes, der Repulsion und der Attraktion, sich als das Aufheben seiner selbst, und somit der Qualität überhaupt, in der Totalität ihres Moments, äussert hat."

Our purpose here is to study the Dialectic under this aspect in connection with Aristotle's arguments against the motion of motion in the fifth book of the Physics. However, due to the obscurity of the question in Hegel, it was deemed necessary to clarify our notions of the Dialectic before seeking to compare Hegel with Aristotle and thereby define the problem more exactly. First, therefore, we shall treat of the fundamental triad of the Dialectic and then we shall state how in the passage from one triad to another the Dialectic involves motion of motion.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, System der Philosophie, erster Teil. Die Logik (Jubiläumsausgabe, Stuttgart, 1955) (alias-Die Enzyklopedie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften, herein referred to as "die Enzyklopedie") 98 Zusatz 2 (the paragraph numbers are the same for the English translation).

Chapter 1: The Dialectic: Its Origins

In attempting to understand Hegel's Dialectic it is best to start from the characteristic which strikes us most forcibly at first. This characteristic is the oft mentioned coincidence of opposites in the synthesis of each triad. It is generally supposed that in posing such a coincidence of opposites Hegel violated the principle of contradiction defended by Aristotle in book IV of the Metaphysics. Were this truly the case, we would have no more to say. While it is not my intention to exonerate Hegel completely, I do believe that not only is there something to say in his favor in this regard, but that if, for the purpose of discussion, we assume his fundamental idealist point of view, we can so construe his doctrine as to save him on this point and at the same time open up the true significance of this doctrine and judge the inherent coherence of his system as a whole in the light of his own fundamental idealist position.

If it is a question of the principle of contradiction in the doctrine of Hegel, we do not have far to go for an answer, for Hegel himself treats of this problem in the second part of the Logic, the Doctrine of Essence. The first category which

Hegel treats is that of Identity (115 of the Encyclopedia).
For him, the principle of contradiction is understood as
the principle of Identity--"everything is identical with
itself; A is A" and "A cannot be A and non-A under the same
respect (zurleich)".

Naturally, as he says, understood in this sense the
"principle of contradiction" permits only the most inane
tautologies such as "Magnetism is Magnetism," and "Spirit is
Spirit," etc. Of course, continues Hegel, the "principle of
contradiction" understood in this way instead of being the
most common principle of all thought, true, and per se notum
omnibus, is constantly denied every minute of every day by
ordinary common sense. No one in his right mind goes around
saying that a rose is a rose, unless it be Gertrude Stein who
by her profession is absolved from merely ordinary speech. We
say a rose is red. But this, says Hegel, is a contradiction,
because a rose is not red, nor is red a rose.

For the Aristotelian there seems to be something
inconclusive here. Indeed, there is something wrong, but
Hegel is not inconclusive from his point of view. He is
reasoning in correct syllogistic form from his own premises,
which, it so happens, are not those of Aristotle. Hence,
there is a difference in the interpretation of the principle
of contradiction.

We do not need to go very far to find the root of 5
that difference either, for Hegel himself gives it in the very
same paragraph where in criticising what he calls formal or
Understanding-Identity he reveals that the root of this
difference between himself and Aristotle is the idealist
theory of abstraction. Let us first look at Hegel's text.

Formelle or Verstandes-Identität ist diese Identität,
insofern an ihr festgehalten und von dem Unterschiede
abstrahiert wird. Oder die Abstraktion ist vielmehr das
Setzen dieser formellen Identität, die Verwandlung eines
in sich Konkreten in diese Form der Einfachheit, --es sei,
dass ein Teil des am Konkreten vorhandenen Mannigfaltigen
weggelassen (durch das sogenannte Analysieren) und nur
eines derselben herausgenommen wird, oder dass mit Weg-
lassung ihrer Verschiedenheit die mannigfaltigen
Bestimmtheiten in Eine zusammengesetzte werden.

Abstraction for Hegel is the intellectual function
of separating the various characters of a concrete whole given
in Verstellung or Representation. In this process the concrete
whole is resolved into atomic parts in the intelligence. The
process is essentially one of negation, a process of looping
off this and that character of the concrete whole until it is
reduced to a greater and greater simplicity. The result of
this process is naturally a state where the former characters
of the concrete whole are held in isolation from each other
and from the concrete whole.

The immediate problem which arises from this point
of view is that of joining different predicates of the same
concrete whole. For Aristotle the solution was simple.
Knowledge that redness and sourness were joined in a single

enunciation was justified by the fact that it was this thing in reality which was both red and sour.¹ Indeed, not only were predicates per accidens joined only by reference to the same subject, it was also true that even such per se enunciations as "man is a rational animal" found their ultimate justification in a reference to the thing existing in reality. Animality and rationality are joined in the common conception we have of man which is based on the reality of man itself. But as Cassirer says, the great difference between Aristotle's logical theory and modern theory is precisely that Aristotle constructed his purely logical relations in reference to the basic relations of the real substance existent in reality.² Modern theory, following Kant, is opposed to Aristotle in that for the moderns the basic relation to the real is, (at least theoretically,) impossible. When we have denied all our knowledge of the thing in itself, the knowledge of things through their sensible attributes, which are impressed on our external senses and composed in our imagination, can

1 St. Thomas, I pars, ques. 85, art 5 ad 3um.

2 Cassirer, Ernst, Substance and Function and Einstein's theory of Relativity (Chicago -1923) p. 7:
 "The logical doctrine of the construction of the concept and of definition can only be built up with reference to those fundamental relations of the real. The determination of the concept according to its next higher genus and its specific difference reproduces the process by which the real substance successively unfolds itself in its special forms of being. Thus it is this basic conception of substance to which the purely logical theories of Aristotle constantly have reference."

pass into intellectual knowledge, that is, universal knowledge, only in so far as the concrete whole is split up and each characteristic is considered by itself. As such with the relation to the thing in itself gone, the knowledge of the concrete whole, which is only a partial knowledge in itself, can never be used to signify the whole. For the idealist all our concepts necessarily prescind both from matter and from the totality composed of matter and the other forms. Hence, predication of one concept of another becomes impossible, because each concept signifies only a part and it is evident that no integral part is predicated of another nor of the whole from which it was taken.

Hegel, in assuming this general idealist view, is found to equate abstraction with negation. For the Dialectic there are immediately two important consequences which come directly from the theory of abstraction. The first of these appears to us at first in the form of a paradox. The problem is noted by Cassirer who says, "at this point, a new and more general difficulty arises to threaten the traditional logical doctrine. If we merely follow the traditional rule for passing from the particular to the universal, we reach the paradoxical result that thought, in so far as it mounts from lower to higher and more inclusive concepts, moves in mere negations. The essential

act here presupposed is that we drop certain determinations, which we had hitherto held; that we abstract from them and exclude them from consideration as irrelevant."—He continues, "If we adhere strictly to this conception, we reach the strange result that all the logical labor which we apply to a given sensuous intuition serves only to separate us more and more from it. Instead of reaching a deeper comprehension of its import and structure, we reach only a superficial schema from which all peculiar traits of the particular case have vanished."³

The difficulty of abstraction when seen from the idealist point of view is acute, but not insoluble. The return to definite concretion by mind is accomplished, says Cassirer, by another discovery of Hegel, the concrete universal. The example Cassirer gives is that of the mathematical formula for the circle and the ellipse which being one in itself can, without the formation of a new concept, reproduce all the infinitely varying instances of circle and ellipse by merely substituting different values for the parameter. Thus it is at the same time abstract and concrete because it contains the particular cases within itself.

³ ibid., p. 18 under the sub-title "The negative process of abstraction"

In Hegel the concrete universal is derived immediately from his theory of abstraction and both the theory of abstraction and the consequent theory of the concrete universal are essential moments of the Dialectic. His reasoning can be reduced to the following. If we carry out the process of abstraction to its very limit, our negative leaving off of determinations (all characteristics are determinations for Hegel) will terminate necessarily at the limit in the most abstract concept which will be pure negation. But the most abstract concept is das reine Sein, the first mental determination or category in Hegel's logic. This pure being is being without any content at all-- it is nothing.⁴

Thus, the concrete universal for Hegel is the universal which contains its determining factor within itself. But determination is negation, as Spinoza said. Hence, the fact that in following out the idealist theory of abstraction to its logical limit Hegel discovers a negative factor contained in the very concept of being allows him to proceed from the most abstract to the concrete a priori, that is, without returning to sense to form a new concept. Thus the Dialectic is not only a development, it is a self-development, and a self-determining one, for all is unified in being which

⁴ Encyclopedia, §6 "Das reine Sein macht den Anfang, weil es sowohl reiner Gedanke als das unbestimmte, einfache Unmittelbare ist, der erste Anfang aber nichts Vermitteltes und weiter Bestimmtes sein kann."

develops itself as a peculiar sort of "genus".⁵

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The origin of the Dialectic is in reality quite simple. It is merely a matter of following out the particular theory of abstraction which results when we posit that the thing-in-itself or primary substance is unknowable. Its difference from Aristotle's on this point is profound in many ways. First, Aristotle does not deny our knowledge of things and hence the knowledge which we have of them, though partial and incomplete of itself, can be used to signify the whole as existing in reality. In this manner, for Aristotle, the enunciation depends for its unity not on the abstract, formal unity of concept, but on the real underlying unity of the thing in reality.⁶ This is why Aristotle distinguishes between the

⁵ The categories of Hegel are vastly different from those of Aristotle. For Hegel, any concept or, in his language a thought-determination (*Denkbestimmungen*) which is not derived from sense and which serves to unify sense data in any way at all can be termed a category. More specifically the category should be a unity in difference, so that, in its strictest acceptation only those categories which are syntheses in the Dialectic are really categories and really possess truth. The thesis and the antithesis cannot possess truth apart from the synthesis in Hegel's mind. The thesis can be termed "genus" in an improper sense in so far as it is limited by the antithesis or "difference" (likewise in an improper sense) which forms a "species" in the synthesis. Because of his idealist position "being" can be termed a genus in so far as all things which are known are referred to the same intellectual power as to a common matter. On this point cf. St. Thomas, *De Veritate* quæst. 1, art. 14 "Sciendum est igitur, quod omnes formas intelligibiles sunt unius generis, quantumcumque res quarum sunt, sint generum diversorum. Genes enim eadem potentiam intellectivam respiciunt." This, however, is not the proper logical acceptation of "genus" which is applied to concepts in so far as they are related to reality.

⁶ cf. supra, note 1

(modus?)
 modus rei and the rei ut cognita.⁷ The thing as existing in reality is composed of integral parts, but the parts of the thing as existing in mind are concepts which, although they separately give only a partial knowledge of the thing explicitly, are knowledge of the whole thing. Thus since the whole is identical with itself, the whole as known through one partial concept can be combined with the whole as known through another partial concept. Thus enumerations are not limited to pure tautologies in order to save the principle of contradiction. But for Hegel since the correspondence between our partial knowledge and the whole thing in reality is denied, our partial knowledge can only be used as integral parts. Thus, for Hegel the distinction of the thing in reality and as known falls down, and the mode of the thing both in reality ^{and} in mind is equated. The thing is in reality exactly as it is known. Hence, mental composition, like material composition, is of integral parts joined by the copula "is". Of course, any concrete enunciation involving a difference between subject and predicate immediately involves the most resounding contradiction. Hegel in limiting himself to what he calls abstract formal identity, A is A, cannot explain ordinary sentences without violating the principle of contradiction. However, this is not the way Aristotle understands the principle

⁷ cf. St. Thomas, in libros Metaphysicorum, I, lect. 10, n. 113

of contradiction. Indeed, his realist supposition enables him to enunciate concrete reality without contradiction. Hence, we can give a preliminary answer to our question. Hegel does hold that there is a contradiction involved in every sentence in which there is the least difference between subject and predicate, he even pushes his point to say that the enunciation of abstract identity A is A contains a contradiction, because A as subject is different from A as predicate. This is due to his absolute identification of mind and reality. But Hegel, as we shall see, is far from denying the true principle of contradiction as Aristotle understands it, and it is this point which we intend to show in the next chapter where we shall treat of the Dialectic as motion.

THE DIALECTIC AS MOTION

In the first chapter we showed that because of his assumption of a theory of abstraction which is based on the denial of the fundamental logical relation to the real, Hegel explicitly derives a theory of abstraction in which abstraction is negation. This leads him to hold that pure being, that is, being with no determined content at all, is nothing. Hence, nothing issues forth from being. But nothing itself is, as being, an undetermined determination; it has nothing to it to determine it. We cannot ask what this non-being is, or if we can ask it we can never determinately answer the question, because the content of non-being is nil, i. e., undetermined. It is obviously impossible to give a determined answer about something which is undetermined in itself. This is the major line of reasoning which Hegel follows. Since it causes some wonderment, we shall attempt to explain it more fully, but first let us outline the further development of the triad.

Being is non-being, and non-being, since it issues forth from being, is a determinate negation, that is, a

negation of being and therefore refers explicitly to being. I do not think it is a propos here to insist on the possible confusion which he might have made between an infinite noun and a determinate negation, for it does not seem to lead us to the problem of the motion of motion. Let us simply assume that this non-being is a determinate negation.

To fully appreciate Hegel's argument here we must keep in mind the background of his theory about the history of philosophy in which Scepticism in its total negations represents the antithesis. Thus, Hegel argues that we cannot just negate being, i. e., say that being is not, because, and this is tautologously evident, being is, too. The upshot is that we cannot at one moment affirm being and at another moment negate being. There must be a further moment in which being and non-being are seen as perfectly identical, that is, as identical as A is to A.

This further moment of the triad is brought about by the negation of the negation. For St. Thomas, who also uses the expression in a somewhat similar context, that is, in speaking of motion and the negation in a determined category.¹ The

¹ St. Thomas, De Veritate, quæst. 28, art. 6

negation of the affirmation, of white, for example, is a real negation because it corresponds to a real corruption of white which is accompanied by the production of black or red or some other determined color. But the negation of the negation, that is, the negation of non-white is only of reason. It does not differ at all in reality from the affirmation of white, but it does bring us to a new way of considering the affirmation of white and thus necessitates a new concept in mind.

For Hegel, of course, there is no difference between being of a reason and a real being. The two are absolutely identical. But this does not explain how it is possible for him to consider the negation of the negation as a new category of his logic in which there is a genuine gain in knowledge and progress toward the concrete, until it is realized that there is a fundamental negation of the negation which is even prior to the logic. This negation of the negation concerns Hegel's attitude to Kant's sing-an-sich.

Kant held that the thing-in-itself, the subject of sensible qualities and the continuum, was perfectly unknowable. All that can be known of it are its sensible qualities; not even the continuum or determinations in space and time can be known, indeed these are held to be fundamentally inherent in mind and not predicable of the thing at all. Such a theory is basically unsound because it posits that we know things

different from what they are, which is absurd in any context.²
 Hence, Hegel decided that the Ding-an-sich was nothing but a figment of mind. It is the caput mortuum of abstraction, what is left when knowledge has completely exhausted the concrete whole given in representation by taking off every form or determination (the terms are equivalent in Hegel's context).³

2 of. The Antinomies of Kant in the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft and Hegel's remarks to this propos Enzyklopedie "48:"
 Die Hauptsache, die zu bemerken ist, ist, dass nicht nur in den vier besondern aus der Kosmologie genommenen Gegenständen die Antinomie sich befindet, sondern vielmehr in allen Gegenständen aller Gattungen, in allen Vorstellungen, Begriffen und Ideen. Dies zu wissen und die Gegenstände in dieser Eigenschaft zu erkennen, gehört zum Wesentlichen der philosophischen Betrachtung; diese Eigenschaft macht das aus, was weiterhin sich als das dialektische Moment des Logischen bestimmt."
 Explanation - Kant proposed at the beginning of his treatise that the Ding-an-sich cannot be known, later he sought to prove it. The proof consisted in this: our thoughts about the Ding-an-sich are contradictory; but the Ding-an-sich cannot be contradictory, hence, these thoughts do not apply to the Ding-an-sich. But the further consequence is that these thoughts are derived from the Ding-an-sich in some way, hence we know reality not as it is, but as it is not, which is absurd. Hegel solves the question quite simply, if falsely, by saying that reality itself is contradictory.

3 Enzyklopedie, 44: "Das Ding-an-sich (--und unter dem Ding wird auch der Geist, Gott, befasst) drückt den Gegenstand aus, insofern von allem, was er für das Bewusstsein ist, von allen Gefühlsbestimmungen wie von allen bestimmten Gedanken desselben abstrahiert wir. Es ist leicht zu sehen, was übrig bleibt, --das vollige Abstraktum, das ganz Leere, bestimmt nur noch als Jenseits; das Negative der Vorstellung, des Gefühls, des bestimmten Denkens uaf. Ebenso einfach aber ist die Reflexion, dass dies caput mortuum selbst nur das Produkt des Denkens ist, eben des zur reinen Abstraktion fortgegangenen Denkens, des leeren Ich, das diese leere Identität seiner selbst sich zum Gegenstande macht. Die negative Bestimmung, welche diese abstrakte Identität als Gegenstand erhält, ist gleichfalls unter den Kantischen Kategorien aufgeführt und ebenso etwas ganz Bekanntes wie jene leere Identität. --Man muss sich hiernach nur wundern, so oft wiederholt gelesen zu haben, man wisse nicht, was das Ding-an-sich sei; und es ist nichts leichter als dies zu wissen."

The concrete whole is then supposed to exist in this completely denuded state. However, this is absurd, because the supposed thing which is left as a residue has no determination, no quality, no whatness at all. It is nothing and nothing does not exist.

But this non-ens is a concept formed by mind, argues Hegel, and it must have reference to something. Hence, it can only have reference to mind itself, its producer. The Ding-an-sich is mind as non-mind. It is the inaccessible object par excellence, that which is forever thrown over and against mind. The Ding-an-sich is thus the primary negation of mind. The negation of the Ding-an-sich is therefore in reality a negation of the negation.

What is gained in this fundamental negation of negation is simply this. Mind in the first stage was one with itself, simple unity. In producing the object (it is Hegel's main thesis which he defends in the Phenomenology of Mind that knowing subject and object are one and that object is produced by the knowing subject) in producing the object, mind creates duality or difference.⁴ However, even at this second stage mind

⁴ cf. Hegel's interpretation of the "myth" of Adam and Eve. Encyclopedia, 24 Zusatz 3

is unconscious of the fact that it is itself the object. It is only in explicitly denying the existence of the Ding-an-sich that mind becomes conscious of the fact that it is the object or Ding-an-sich itself.


Thus in the thesis, mind or in general the affirmed, whatever it may be, is only an sich its opposite--i.e., it is unconscious of what it really is. In the second stage or antithesis, the opposite which is a purely negative aspect, and in so far as it is purely negative is considered by Hegel to be defective and characteristic of scepticism, takes on a falsely acquired being for itself. It is only in the negation of the negation that opposite or antithesis becomes the thesis an and für sich. Für sich means conscious. The difficulty in understanding Hegel does not lie only in the meaning he gives them: an means unconscious or not known, für means conscious or known--consciousness and knowing being equated for Hegel. The real difficulty arises in understanding just what the 'sich' or relative pronoun refers to. This last point can be explained in the following manner, although Hegel himself does not do it. Being is being für sich, though this is evident and hence need not be stated. But being is an sich (in itself) non-being. When non-being issues forth non-being is non-being für sich, which is also taken as too obvious to be mentioned. As a matter of fact it is only when the antithesis becomes sceptical, that is, when it takes itself for the supreme truth of the

matter, that it becomes truly for sich. These uses of for sich are irrelevant and, though possible, never occur in Hegel. It is only at the stage of synthesis that the thesis is said to be an und for sich the antithesis. Being is in itself non-being, that is, the whiteness of being is non-being, or, to use a somewhat hyperbolic expression, the being of being is non-being, and being realizes, i.e., becomes conscious of what it is in the synthesis, it is non-being in and for itself.

However, this explanation is only preliminary to the important question, does Hegel deny the principle of contradiction? It is perhaps impossible to keep a straight face when a question is explicitly posed about something which is supposedly taken for granted and which everyone knows. Of course, Hegel denied the principle of contradiction. But we must remember that he understood the principle of contradiction differently from Aristotle and was apt to say he denied it, even when there is a good foundation for saying he did not.

We may try to reconcile Hegel with St. Thomas by saying that the similitudes of objects as existing in the mind in esse intentionale do not possess contrariety and we might suppose that they do not possess contradiction either.⁵ It is

⁵ cf. to this question, III De Anima, 427 a 0; St. Thomas, De sensu et sensato, lect. 19 n. 291 (explanation of first mentioned text); ibid., lect. 5, nn. 61-62; IV Sent. Dist. 1 quass. 1 art. 4 ad secundam questionem; De Veritate, quass. 2 art. 14.



true that for the human mind, according to St. Thomas, contraries are known through each other and that one contrary is the cause of the knowledge of the other.⁶ For Hegel, who does not distinguish between being in thought and being in reality, cause of knowledge is cause of being. This is indeed a contradiction, because one contrary is not the cause of the being of the other, but rather the cause of its non-being and destruction. However, there is even a grain of truth, however small it may be, in Hegel's position which, I think, may serve to explain how he arrived at his position with such flawless regularity. It concerns the problem of the one and the many, but the principles contained therein may be used to illuminate the whole Dialectic.

The one and the many are contraries; the one cannot be the many nor viceversa. But at the same time each of the many is a one, so that the one seems to be constitutive of the many. This is contradictory because one contrary is not the cause of the being of the other.

⁶ St. Thomas, 1-11, quæst. 35 art. 5 ad 2um: "dicendum quod ea quæ sunt contraria in rerum natura, secundum quod sunt in mente, non habent contrarietatem. Non enim ratio nec contrariorum sunt contrariæ sed magis unum contrarium est ratio cognoscendi aliud. Propter quod est una scientia contrariorum."

St. Thomas answers from the realist point of view that contraries are to be understood as differing by their opposite forms. When we say, he continues, that some things are contraries, we must understand them as having a form, not as part of that which has a form. An inanimate body is a complete being and as such is opposed to besouled body as inanimate is opposed to animate. But in so far as body is taken not as a complete being, that is, a being having a form, and ^{but} not as a part of that which has a form, body is not opposed to animate, but is rather its material part. The same is seen in numbers. In so far as two is a certain whole it is opposed to three, but in so far as two is a part, that is, an incomplete being, it can form part of three. Thus, one itself can be considered in two ways: either as a whole, that is, as a complete being, or as a part, that is, as an incomplete being, or, to put it in other words, as an undetermined being. In the first way, the one is not many, but in the second way one is a part of the many.⁷

⁷ St. Thomas, in X Metaph. lect. 4, n. 1992 "Sed contra ea quae hic Philosophus determinat, duplex dubitatio consurgit. Prima quidem circa hoc quod dicit, quod unum et multa opponuntur ut contraria. Hoc enim videtur impossibile, quia unum constituit multitudinem. Unum autem contrariorum non constituit aliud, sed vagis destruit. Sciendum igitur est, quod cum contraria differant secundum formam ut infra dicetur, cum dicimus aliqua esse contraria, accipiendum est utrumque eorum secundum quod habet formam, non autem secundum quod est pars habentis formam. Corpus enim secundum quod absque anima accipitur ut formam habens, opponitur animali ut inanimatum animato. Secundum vero quod accipitur non quasi aliquod perfectum et formatum, non opponitur animali, sed est pars materialis ipsius. Et sic etiam videmus in numeris. Nam binarius secundum quod est quoddam totum, speciem et formam determinatam habens, est diversum specie a ternario; si ver

There is indeed here both a duality of being and a duality of knowing. However, the mode of that duality is different. In reality it is the nature which is found sometimes as a complete being excluding any other qualities, sometimes as a part or imperfect being which goes into composition with another part to form a whole. In mind it is the similitude of that nature which, being one in itself, gives us a knowledge of the nature. This knowledge can be considered either as not excluding other perfections which may be found, rooted in that nature or as excluding these natures. If we take the knowledge of body as not excluding any other quality which may be found in it, such as soul, the knowledge of body may be used as a genus, and as such we can say, "an animated thing is a body". In this way body is a whole, but not in the sense in which we understood "whole" above. Here it is a logical whole, that is, it can be predicated of the whole living being. However

consideretur absque hoc quod sit perfectum per formam, est pars ternarii. Sic igitur et ipsum unum secundum quod consideratur ut in se perfectum et speciem quandam habens, opponitur multitudini; quia quod est unum, non est multa neque e contra. Prout vero consideratur ut non completum secundum speciem et formam, sic non opponitur multitudini, sed est pars ejus."

if we take the knowledge of body as excluding soul or any other perfection, we have knowledge of an integral part of the living being. In this way body, as a concept, is exclusive of any other quality or perfection such as soul, and is a part. It cannot be predicated directly: we cannot say, "an animated thing is a body", but rather in this sense we must say "an animated thing has a body".⁸

Thus since the mode of knowing corresponds to the mode of being in reality, we find that in both cases there is an indeterminate or incomplete being. In reality it is the part, and in mind, for the very same reason, it is a whole but in a different sense of whole and part. Of course, this undeterminate being is not completely undetermined. However, if there is to be an "undetermined" which is only partially "undetermined", there must ultimately be a completely undetermined.

Hegel, as we said before, rejects the Ding-an-sich, which is, for him, the completely undetermined. Usually, Kant's Ding-an-sich is taken as equivalent to Aristotle's substantia prima. I do not intend to quarrel with an interpretation of Kant's Ding-an-sich here; I wish merely to point out that if we accept Hegel's idea of the Ding-an-sich

⁸ cf. St. Thomas, De Ente et Essentia, chapter 3

is completely undetermined. This is, in Aristotle, as Hegel himself says, prime matter and not substantia prima.⁹

But in rejecting the Ding-an-sich Hegel rejects the undetermined altogether. It is, as a real, independent being, a non-entity. It is only a product of mind as indeed it is only a mental figment to think of prime matter as something definitely formed.

The controversy here is not one of interpretation of Kant. When reading Kant we may assume that the Ding-an-sich is substantia prima. Indeed, Hegel himself assumed as much in his section in the Phenomenology on the "Thing and its Properties" (second chapter) and in the corresponding sections in the second part of the Logic.¹⁰ However, his most basic view of the Ding-an-sich is that it is the perfectly unknowable and undetermined in itself. The difference in interpretation comes from taking the Ding-an-sich either as found in Kant's initial position of the question (subject of sensible qualification and the non-inform) or as found in Kant's final determination of the question (Ding-an-sich as completely unknowable). If the Ding-an-sich in Kant is an equivocal term when compared to Aristotle and the foundation for an outright contradiction in Hegel, that should not be a reflection on the consistency of the commentator's thought.

⁹ Enzyklopedie, 128: "Dieses Ding, das immer ohne Attribute laulich beschaffen, was das Ding-an-sich, nur dieses also ist, welches ohne alle Attribute, ohne alle Beschaffenheit, unbestimmt ist."

In rejecting the *Ding-an-sich* Hegel rejects the "undetermined" or matter. There are two consequences of this rejection which we cannot pass by here. The first is that the problem of how one contrary is opposed and constitutive of the other is insoluble for him without contradiction. He cannot consider the nature as composed of a determining and an undetermined part, of form and matter or, in the order of knowledge, of difference and genus. But he usurps the realist position here, perhaps unwittingly. One contrary is, in a way, constitutive of its opposite, that is either in so far as the matter of one contrary is the matter of the other; or in simple things, in so far as the basic nature can variously be considered as whole, i. e., perfect and complete, and as part, i. e., as material and incomplete. Hegel thus finds that being is really non-being in itself. This is not surprising, because pure or simple being is being without a determinate whatness, but it does have an undeterminate ground (i. e. "fond" in French) or substrate which is something positive, that is, matter is not simple non-being in itself. In rejecting this undetermined substrate, Hegel finds that it is non-being; there is nothing difficult in this, it is the only other possibility left. But since the "undetermined" is common to both being and non-being, we may, commenting on Hegel's view, say that being is made of non-being and non-being is made of being. Being is made of non-being, because the substrate of being is now, in Hegel's view, non-being. Non-being is made of being, because in knowing non-being we assume

being and think of it as not out there. To this imaginative picture of a there with nothing in it there corresponds an intellectual concept of non-being as a being of reason or concept with no corresponding object in reality. This is what Hegel's view looks like when seen in the light of Aristotle, and it is, I believe, the only way in which an explicit knowledge of Hegel can be had. But where Aristotle could escape from contradiction by variously considering the nature as whole and as part, Hegel is limited, by this rejection of the "undetermined", to merely perfect beings, wholes in reality which exclude other properties, and integral parts in thought, which likewise exclude properties other than those explicitly contained in the concept. Thus the position we outlined in the first chapter is confirmed by other arguments.

The second point which flows from his rejection of the undetermined, is Hegel's doctrine of Meinung or meaning. This has little to do with the ordinary problem of the meaning of words in logic, and indeed it is hard to classify Meinung as to where it goes in philosophical discussion. What is important is to realize that when Hegel accuses us of a bloße Meinung, a mere, subjective intimation, he means that we are basing our distinction on an "undetermined" which is essentially undetermined and therefore cannot ever attain the clarity which he requires of objective discourse. The first case of

Meinung in the Logic comes precisely in connection with the attempt to "fix" being and keep it from passing over into non-being.

Wenn der Gegensatz in dieser Unmittelbarkeit als Sein und Nichts ausgedrückt ist, so scheint es als zu auffallend, dass er nichtig sei, als dass man nicht versuchen sollte, das Sein zu fixieren und es gegen den Übergang zu bewahren. Das Nachdenken muss in dieser Hinsicht darauf verfallen, für das Sein eine feste Bestimmung aufzusuchen, durch welche es von dem Nichts unterschieden wäre. Man nimmt es z. B. als das in allem Wechsel Beharrende, die unendlich bestimmbare Materie usf., oder auch ohne Nachdenken als irgend eine einzelne Existenz, das nächste beste Sinnliche oder Geistige. Aber alle solche weiteren und konkreteren Bestimmungen lassen das Sein nicht mehr als das reine Sein, wie es hier im Anfang unmittelbar ist. Nur in und um dieser reinen Unbestimmtheit willen ist es Nichts; --ein unsagbares; sein Unterschied von dem Nichts ist eine blosse Meinung.

We can neither fix being to a singular existent nor drag in matter, he says, because in the case of the individual we can never determinately say which it is we are talking about. The individual is attainable, but only by a subjective intimation which can never become objective. Indeed, if this is the requirement for talking about individuals, we must abandon the task forever, because the objective is by definition the universal and necessary according to Kant's imposition of the terms, and the individual is of course not universal nor does he demonstrate concretely any necessity, and this is valid even in Aristotle's context, wherein there is no science of individuals. But let us return to our principal question. How does Hegel posit the unity of being and non-being, for this is his problem, without denying the principle of contradiction? We could answer by saying that Hegel follows Descartes' point of view where

we go from concept in mind to reality. Under this supposition we can only conclude a priori from the clarity and distinctness of concept to the existence of its counterpart in reality. Limited thus to what is given explicitly in conception, we must necessarily conclude that the thing exists in reality as it exists in mind. According to Aristotle's teaching opposites in mind are not opposite. Hence we could answer our question by saying that if reality is equated to mind, Hegel has not violated Aristotle's principle of contradiction, because opposites in mind do not exclude each other.

Now, although it is true that opposites in mind are no longer subject to opposition, a distinction must be made as regards Aristotle's teaching if we are to apply it to Hegel. The reason is that the thing as existing in the mind is in the mind not of itself, for then it would be in itself as it is in mind (a negation of the realist distinction between the way a thing is in itself in reality and the way a thing is in the mind as known). It is in the mind by means of a similitude of itself. This similitude, though, can exist in either one of two ways. In only one of these ways can Aristotle's teaching be applied to Hegel.

It must be kept in mind here when discussing the coincidence of opposites in mind that we are discussing a

property of the similitude in so far as the similitude is a real being, a real modification of the mind, not in so far as it is representative of the thing.¹¹ In this way the similitude follows the mode of being of things in themselves to a certain degree. As a certain res, therefore, the similitude can exist in mind, in such a way, that the similitude of opposites, for example, black and white, do not possess contrariety as they exist in the mind. The reason is that the similitude, qua a certain res, does not possess a fully actual being. It does not inform the knower, by a permanent, real being which takes a complete hold on the matter of the knower. Complete information of the knower in this way would involve the partial or total corruption of the knower as when something becomes in the strict sense. The similitude cannot inform the mind in this way without destroying knowledge. Hence, the similitude of the object takes only a transitory, passing hold on the knower, and as such has only a passing being, a being

¹¹ St. Thomas, Q.D. De Veritate, q. 2 art. 5, ad 17um; "Dicendum quod hoc modo aliquid cognoscitur, secundum quod est in cognoscente representatum, et non secundum quod est in cognoscente existens. Similitudo enim in vi cognoscitiva existens non est principium cognitionis rei secundum esse quod habet in potentia cognoscitiva, sed secundum relationem quam habet ad rem cognitam. Et inde est quod non per modum quo similitudo rei habet esse in cognoscente, res cognoscitur, sed per modum quo similitudo in intellectu existens est representativa rei;"

which is analogous to the being of motion. More properly it is like the being of an image in a mirror or color in a transparent medium. This being is called "esse intentionale". It is a real, though imperfect, being, and under this aspect it is comparable to motion. Like motion it does not go into one of the Aristotelian categories of real being directly, but is reduced to one of them as the imperfect is reduced to the perfect.¹² Also, like motion it is not fully in act, not fully in possession of matter and therefore, like motion, it retains some of the unactuated potency of matter. It is the property of matter to contain opposites simultaneously, because opposites in potency do not exclude each other, or, in

12 St. Thomas, in IV sent. d. 1 q. 1, a. 4, ad 3am quæst.: "Instrumentum agit ut motum ab alio. Et ideo competit sibi virtus proportionata motui; motus autem non est ens completum sed est via in ens quasi medium quid inter potentiam puram et actum purum, ut dicitur in III Physicorum (201 a 10; lect. 2, n. 3). Et ideo virtus instrumenti inquantum huiusmodi, secundum quod agit ad effectum ultra id quo competit sibi secundum suam naturam, non est ens completum habens esse fixum in naturam, sed quiddam ens incompletum: sicut est virtus imitandi visum in aere, inquantum est instrumentum motus ab exteriori visibili. Et huiusmodi entia consueverunt intentionem nominari et habent aliquid simile ens entis quod est in anima quod est ens diminutum, ut dicitur in VI Metaphysicorum."

Ibid. ad primam: "Dicendum quod ens incompletum quod est in anima, dividitur contra ens dictinctum per decem genera, ut patet in VI Metaphysicorum (3026 a 35). Et ideo talia entia incompleta, per se loquendo non sunt in aliquo genere nisi per reductionem: sicut motus quantum ad suam substantiam reducitur ad illud genus in quo sunt termini actus, sicut imperfectum ad perfectum."

other words, opposites in potency are not opposites.¹³

Thus, in as much as the intentional similitude is nonetheless something real, as a quality in the mind ut res, it does not have the actuality of the thing it represents and so there is not contrariety between the intentional similitudes of contraries. In this sense Hegel could posit the co-existence of opposites in mind without violating the principle of contradiction.

However, this is only one of the ways in which the similitude can be in mind and Aristotle's teaching when interpreted in this sense of the being of things in mind can not be applied to Hegel. First, as regards Aristotle's teaching, it must be recognized that the similitude as considered above is in a state half-way between potency and act. As such it is entirely

¹³ St. Thomas, Quodlibet Sententiarum, q. 1, art. 1: "Et similiter in intellectu in habitu sunt similitudines intelligibilium ut dispositiones; sed quando sunt actus intellectus, sunt in eo ut forme perfectiores, et tunc intellectus fit omnino res intellectus; et hoc continetur per intentionem, quae conjungit intellectum intelligibili, et sensum sensibili, ut dicit Augustinus. Unde patet quod sicut una res materialis non potest esse simul plura actu, ita unus intellectus non potest simul plura intelligere primo."

possible for two or more similitudes to exist simultaneously in the mind, but as such the similitude does not elicit an actual act of cognition. (We are still considering the similitude as quasdam res, not as representative of things.) The similitude as such is only in habitu. When mind passes from the state of knowledge in habitu to actual consideration in actu secundo it is impossible for mind to use two similitudes at once. The reason is that as eliciting a definite act of knowledge, the similitude is analogously related to the cognitive power as substantial form is related to prime matter. Obviously there can only be one substantial form in its subject, i.e., in prime matter, at once, else the thing would be two things and not one. Hence, as eliciting an act of knowledge, i.e., in actu perfecto, there cannot be more than one similitude in the knowing power at any given time.¹⁴

The reason, for St. Thomas, is that no finite mind,

¹⁴ St. Thomas, In III De Anima, lect. 11, n. 749:
 "Oportet autem quod intellectus noster, qui sic cognoscit unum contrarium per alterum, sit in potentia co-noscens, et quod in ipso sit species unius oppositi per quam aliud cognoscat, ita quod quandoque sit in ipso species albi, et quandoque species nigri, ut per unum possit cognoscere alterum. Si autem esset aliquis intellectus, qui non inest unum contrarium, ad cognitionem alterius, tunc oportet, quod talis intellectus cognoscat seipsum primo, et per seipsum cognoscat alia, et quod sit simpliciter actu, et sit penitus separabilis a materia, etiam secundum esse, ut extensum est de intellectu dei in deductione metaphysicorum."

whether human or angelic, can actually use more than one intelligible species in full distinctness at the same time.¹⁵ In the case of man, it is through the specification of the similitude that mind comes to knowledge of things and knowledge of itself. It is in the knowledge of our perception of things that we arrive at consciousness and at the idea of one, as Avicenna says. Were there, per impossibile, to exist a duality of similitude in our mind in perfect act, the mind would be doubly conscious.

Thus, although the contrariety and opposition of things disappears in the similitude of things as they exist in mind, a new kind of opposition appears, that of the impossibility of more than one similitude existing in perfect act in the mind at once, whether these are of contraries, contradictories or simply disparate concepts. Hence, not even by considering being and non-being as existing in the mind can we answer, from Aristotle's point of view, the question of how we can join two distinct concepts at once, and we say that this

¹⁵ St. Thomas, Q.D. De Veritate, q. 8, art. 14

is precisely the problem for Hegel--to unify being and non-being without denying the principle of contradiction.

Aristotle would join two distinct concepts, as we saw, by referring them to the thing-in-itself. But even allowing our knowledge of the thing-in-itself we must join the two distinct concepts into one similitude. In different cases the similitudes would give us a different kind of concept. When we think horses and men at the same time it would be by means of the generic concept "animal" which is one in similitude. Likewise, the subject and predicate of a proposition are joined into one because the predicate is to the subject as form is to matter. Matter or the determinable and form or the determining form one whole. It is in so far as horses and men are reduced as parts to a whole ("animal") which is one in similitude and subject and predicate are subsumed as parts under a whole that they can be thought at once, just as the intelligence understands the continuum as a whole directly and the parts of the continuum indirectly in so far as these parts are reduced to potency in the whole. But this reduction of diverse concepts as parts to a whole is based on a reference to things, and ultimately to the matter of the things-in-themselves which is the prime determinable. It is in so far as the genus is a single concept of what is common in horses and men that horses and men can be known at once. But this common trait in horses and men is a part in reality, i.e., it is non-exclusive and imperfect, as explained above, and

it is a whole in mind precisely for the same reason. The property of being non-exclusive is precisely the material or determinable. Thus the subject of the proposition can be coupled with the predicate because it is non-exclusive, as matter, in respect to the predicate which is as form. The subject is the mental whole in which the predicate is thought, because it is the similitude of real substance which is incomplete and in potency to accidental forms by reason of its matter. Thus, all mental composition is based on the fundamental relation of concept to thing-in-itself and the matter of things.

But once we have rejected our knowledge of things-in-themselves we are left with merely two mutually exclusive concepts (whether of opposites or not) which, because they are mutually exclusive, cannot be joined among themselves. It is for this reason that Kant posited transcendental apperception, i. e., consciousness itself, as the medium in which distinct concepts are joined. Although Kant employs transcendental apperception only to explain synthetic propositions, the problem arises, in his hypothesis where the thing is absolutely unmovable, even in regards to analytic

propositions.¹⁶ Transcendental apperception is consciousness as given prior to perception of the object, consciousness of the Self as Ding-an-sich and is posited only as an a priori means of joining concepts in themselves. But such a consciousness is not given in man who is in potency to knowledge. It is given only in angels. As we saw above, disparate concepts which are not reduced to a unity in themselves cannot be reduced to unity in transcendental apperception or consciousness. Since human consciousness follows the object, the unity of concept must be sought in the concept itself and not in the knowing subject.

Hegel, in following Kant, cannot resort to a generic concept for the desired unity. But in rejecting the Ding-an-sich not only on the side of the object but on the side of the subject (der Geist),¹⁷ he also deprives himself of a recourse to transcendental apperception to effect the unity

¹⁶ In respect of this problem there is no difference between analytic and synthetic judgments. Cf. Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, B131: "ob die Vorstellungen selbst identisch sind, und also eine durch die andere analytisch konnte gedacht werden, das kommt hier nicht in Betrachtung. Das Bewusstsein der einen ist, sofern von Mannigfaltigen die Rede ist, vom Bewusstsein der anderen doch immer zu unterscheiden, und auch die Synthesis dieses (möglichen) Bewusstseins kommt es hier allein an."

¹⁷ Hegel, Enzyklopedie, 44

of distinct concepts. But at the same time Hegel places himself in such a position by this rejection of the Ding-an-sich that it becomes impossible for him to accept Aristotle's solution for the co-existence of similitudes in mind in habitu. This aspect of Hegel's rejection of the Ding-an-sich may be referred to as Hegel's phenomenological point of view. Its explanation is the following.

For Aristotle a simultaneity of concept in habitu was possible because he admitted the substantiality of the knower as distinct from his knowing. The knower as substance can receive the similitudes and even store them away without actually using them in an actual cognition, because the act of cognition is an accident in the knowing substance. The knower exists, before, and even without, knowing. Hegel, then, in rejecting the Ding-an-sich, rejects the substantiality of being as it is apart from knowing both in the knower and in the known. There is no longer the knower in potency, substantially existing in himself as distinct from his knowing in actu secundo, an accident of the knower, nor is there a known in potency, substantially existing in reality as distinct from its being known in act, which is per se essens to the thing-in-itself. The known in act, for Hegel, is only

in so far as it is actually known and the knower is only in so far as he is knowing in act. As such the knowable in re is identified with the known qua in the knower. Being is to be known or to know, depending on whether it is seen from the side of the object or from the side of the subject. Both are substantially only in the act of knowing and, since they are substantially where they know, they are identified substantially where they are identified in knowledge. Such is Hegel's interpretation of Aristotle's dictum, intellectus unitur intellectioni or the intelligence and the intelligible are one, an interpretation which, it is clear, is quite different from Aristotle's own interpretation, for whom identity in knowledge is not identity of substances.

In this interpretation Hegel reaches the fullness of Descartes' definition of mind as id cuius totum esse est cognoscere¹⁸ and even takes it one step further. Descartes, a victim of synecdoche, considered mind, which is a substantial part of the whole man, as the whole, but it was still a substantial being of which thought was a "mode". For Hegel, mind is falsely considered as the whole and it exists only as actually knowing and the actually known, too, exists only as

18 Descartes, Discours de la Methode, quatrieme partie

actually known. Hegel wipes every shadow of substantiality as pre-existent to knowing out of Descartes' conception of the mind. In this Hegel returns explicitly to Protagoras's position in which only appearances were known. For this reason we have denominated this particular aspect of Hegel's philosophy his phenomenological point of view. In this view truth lies within the mind in internal conformity of knowledge to knowledge, not without, in conformity of knowledge to things-in-themselves. Subject and object are just two sides of a single piece of knowledge for Hegel.

In the Phenomenology of Mind, subject and object are said to appear as diverse. The contradictions naturally arising from a theory of abstraction based on the denial of our knowledge of things-in-themselves are placed now on the side of the object now on the side of the subject. It is the false appearance (phenomenon) of the distinction of subject and object and the "sophistical", as Hegel terms them, attempts to escape the contradictions arising from his theory of abstraction, which constitute the motive force of the Phenomenology of Mind. (The motive force is the contradiction as will be seen presently). The Phenomenology ends in the explicit, on und für sich, identity of subject and object and it is from this point that the Logic of Hegel begins. As for Protagoras, so for Hegel, man is the measure

of all things.

It is likewise easy to see precisely why Hegel rejects Kant's theory of transcendental apperception. Transcendental apperception is consciousness not of the empirical self but of the Self as Ding-an-sich, a Self which is not given through the object, or through sensible impression, but a Self which is prior, i. e., transcendental, to knowledge coming from without. Not only is such a Self unattainable for humans, it is, like the external Ding-an-sich, unknowable, and, for that reason, rejected by Hegel.

Hence, from this point of view being and non-being cannot exist simultaneously in an imperfect act nor be united in transcendental apperception. They can exist only in full, complete act. Hence, a perfect duality of object, i. e., two similitudes in perfect act, would have the same effect for Hegel as it would for St. Thomas, although for slightly different reasons--it would split mind asunder and make it two in knowing, and, for Hegel two in being. Instead of unifying in strict inter-connected necessity (Zusammenhang), it would irretrievably separate the first two thought-determinations (Gedebestimmungen), thus rendering the universe contingent, i. e., out-side-of-each-other (auseinander).¹⁹ A lack of

¹⁹ cf. our next chapter for a fuller explanation of these terms.

unity between being and non-being would render the Dialectic as a whole contingent, a capital sin for Hegel. Hence, join them he must, and without denying the principle of contradiction in its true sense.

We can see how Hegel accomplishes a union of two distinct concepts in such a way as not to deny the principle of contradiction, if we consider the question carefully from his own principles as revealed in the idealist theory of abstraction described in the first chapter. There we saw that being is, in itself, non-being, so that when we say of something that it is, we find that, in that rarified degree of abstraction which expresses its pure being, the concrete whole from which being is abstracted is really nothing; everything has been lopped off by abstraction. But it is not just pure nothing. It is, although it is at the very limit of abstraction, and it is still presented to mind. Non-being is not, as Parmenides said, nor can it be thought. Hence, this non-being which Hegel proposes for our consideration is, that is, it is still presented to mind. But it is also not, because it is in the "nth" degree of abstraction, and we are back in a non-being where the argument repeats itself going back and forth from being to non-being and back again. Using only these primary determinations which, because they are primary,

are in themselves empty and undetermined (they have no prior determination to determine them), our mind swings back and forth between being and non-being, unable to distinguish between them and unable to fix one of them to the exclusion of the other. And this is what Hegel says:

Es ist gerade nur um das Bewusstsein über diese Anfänge zu tun, nämlich dass sie nichts als diese leere Abstraktionen, und jede von beiden so leer ist als die andere; der Treib, in dem Sein oder in beiden eine feste Bedeutung zu finden, ist diese Notwendigkeit selbst, welche das Sein und Nichts weiter führt und ihnen eine wahre, d. i. konkrete Bedeutung gibt. Diese Fortgehen ist die logische Ausführung und der in Folgenden sich darstellende Vorlauf. Das Nachdenken welches tiefere Bestimmungen für sie findet, ist das logische Denken, durch welches sich solche, nur nicht auf eine zufällige, sondern notwendige Weise, hervorbringen. (Enz., 37)

It is this two-way swaying back and forth in mind which is Werden, and it is the instability of this union of being and non-being in Werden, threatening to sunder mind and the Dialectic apart and set up an impassable chasm between being and non-being by giving each a fixed being in unity which forces mind on to seek refuge in a stable concept, Sein. Hegel does not violate the principle of contradiction by positing a determined, fixed unity of being and non-being, for if he did he would have no reason to go on to further and further concepts. As Aristotle said against Heraclitus, an explicit unity of contradictories is repugnant to notion. There is contradiction in notion, but it is not a determined

contradiction, for if being were already non-being explicitly and the two existed together in perfect act there would be no motion or change at all. Nothing changes to that which is already inherent in it.²⁰ It is indeed the contradiction which is the Treib, the driving force of the Dialectic, but it is only such, as Hegel shows in the text we are about to quote, in as far as being and non-being are in motion, i. e., as vanishing, unstable beings loosely comparable to the kind of beings St. Thomas called "intentional beings". These unstable thought determinations, however, tend to stability and because of this tendency are aufgehoben,²¹ i. e., suppressed

20 St. Thomas, in IV Metaphysicorum, lect. 13, n. 691: "Sextus rationem ponit, dicens, quod illa positio, qua ponunt omnia moveri, repugnat primae eorum positioni, qua ponuntur contradictoria simul verificari de eodem: quia si aliquid simul est et non est, magis sequitur quod omnia quiescant quam quod omnia moveantur. Nihil enim permittitur ad hoc quod jam inest ei; sicut quod jam est album non mutatur ad albedinem. Si autem idem contingit simul esse et non esse, omnia insunt omnibus, ut supra probatum est, quia omnia sunt una. Et ita non erit in quod possit aliquid permittari."

21 cf. Hegel, Enzyklopedie, 96 Zusatz: "Es ist hierbei an die doppelte Bedeutung unseres deutschen Ausdrucks aufheben zu erinnern. Unter aufheben verstehen wir einmal so viel als hinwegraumen, negieren, und sagen demgemäss z.B. ein Gesetz, eine Einrichtung u.s. w. seien aufgehoben. Weiter heisst dann aber auch aufheben so viel als aufbewahren, und wir sprechen in diesem Sinn davon, dass etwas wohl aufgehoben sei. Dieser sprachgebrauchliche Doppelsinn, wonach dasselbe Wort eine negative und eine positive Bedeutung hat, darf nicht als zufällig angesehen, noch etwa gar der Sprache zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, als zu Verwirrung Veranlassung gebend, sondern es ist darin der über das bloss verständige Entweder - Oder hinausreichende spekulative Geist unserer Sprache zu erkennen."

as independent beings and stored away as a hidden contradiction which will again manifest itself in the ensuing triad. In this way they constitute such a driving force. This is undoubtedly Hegel's mind on the subject as appears in the following quotation.

Das Sein im Werden, als eins mit dem Nichts, so das Nichts eins mit dem Sein, sind nur Verschwindende: das Werden fällt durch seinen Widerspruch in sich, in die Einheit, in der beide aufgehoben sind, zusammen; sein Resultat ist somit das Dasein. (Enz. 89)

That Werden is conceived of as motion in Hegel's mind is undoubtable, as we have seen from the above commentary. In comparison to Aristotle, Werden can be called a motion, not, of course, in the strict sense of a physical motion, but only in the sense that the fluctuation of concepts in mind sets up a state of change in its most common acceptation, a state of

----, Phänomenologie des Geistes, die Wahrnehmung, p. 90: "Das Aufheben stellt seine wahrhafte gedoppelte Bedeutung dar, welche wir an den Negativen gesehen haben: es ist ein Negieren und ein Aufbewahren zugleich; "In so far as "Aufhebung" is the Negation of the Negation, though, it must be realized that, "die Negation der Negation ist nicht eine Neutralisation." (Enz. 95) Being and non-being are blurred by their motion in Werden; each is a clear and distinct concept. This is a capital distinction to make in comparing Hegel's motion of Werden to the way St. Thomas considers the coincidence of opposites in motion, cf. St. Thomas, Q. D. De Veritate, q. 3, art. 14: "Allo modo secundum quod sunt in actu imperfecto, ut cum sunt in fieri; et sic e' iam simul esse possunt, ut patet cum aliquis dealbatur: tunc enim toto dealbationis tempore albedo incipit ut in fieri, nigredo vero ut in corrupti."

aliter se habere nunc quam prius. It is this fluctuation of concepts which is called motion analogically by St. Thomas when he speaks of a vicissitudo temporis when speaking of mental activity.²² Not being a motion in the strict physical sense, but only a motion analogically, as a vicissitudo in mind, the synthesis of this first triad of the Logic is denominated Werden analogically by Hegel. Real Werden or becoming only illustrates the synthesis in Vorstellung. For this reason there is no difficulty in Hegel not having assigned the species of becoming, generation and corruption, to Werden at this stage in the Logic, nor in not having determined the precise direction of Werden as either becoming or passing away. He conceives "becoming" as the genus of generation and corruption and then extends this genus to a new meaning, that of signifying the process in mind (and in reality, but primarily in mind) of the fluctuation of being and non-being. Entstehen (generation)

22 St. Thomas, Ia, q. 85, art. 4, ad lum: "Dicendum quod intellectus est supra tempus quod est numerus rerum corporalium rerum. Sed ipsa pluralitas specierum intelligibilium causant vicissitudines quendam intelligibilium operationum, secundum quam una operatio est prior altera. Et hanc vicissitudinem Augustinus nominat tempus, cum dicit, VIII Super Genesim ad litteram, quod Deus movet creaturam spirituales per tempus.

and Versehen (corruption) as categories in Hegel's logic come in much further down.

It is precisely in so far as being and non-being are held together in a constantly fluctuating unity of the kind movement is (i. e., a mixture of being, being in act, and of non-being, being not in act but in potency) that Hegel escapes by a hair's breadth from violating the principle of contradiction as Aristotle understood it.

Now is there a difficulty in calling Werden a motion when motion is between contraries and Werden is between contradictories. The reason is that Hegel regards contradictories not as existing in reality but only as existing in mind. Viewed in this way contradictories are not contradictories as contradictories are in reality, but have only the contrariety of two similitudes competing for a hold in mind. From this point of view Hegel's "contradictories", being and non-being which are so only by an erstwhile reference to reality which is now superseded, can be considered as contraries and thus in motion, even though this motion is only analogously motion. But contraries precisely as in motion are not beings perfectly in act. Hence, qua in the special kind of motion which seems to issue forth from the idealist theory of abstraction the unity of being and non-being in Werden does not violate the principle of contradiction.

CHAPTER III

HEGEL'S AIM IN THE DIALECTIC

Above we defined the most essential terms in Hegel's Dialectic and showed how he can be understood not to have violated the principle of contradiction. It is our intention here to give very briefly the main presuppositions of this Dialectic as a whole before going into a determinate study of the problem of the notion of notion in Hegel.

The Dialectic is conceived in Hegel's mind as a completely necessary, essentially interconnected system of categories or thought-determinations (*Denkbestimmungen*). For Hegel, every thought is a category, even such concrete thoughts as Spirit, Chemistry, Teleology, as well as the very abstract thoughts of being and non-being. Apparently there are as many categories as there are concepts, each of these being a "thought-determination", however, why Hegel should dub them categories goes beyond our immediate interests. His point is to construct a whole, the whole universe of thought, nature, spirit, a whole which is equated in its entirety with the Absolute. Using his theory of the concrete universal, Hegel proceeds from abstract being down to the most concrete concepts in an orderly fashion, reducing the less universal from the more universal determination.

The Dialectic is the construction of the whole or the Absolute. But it is a deduction, not just a haphazard gathering up and binding together of concepts unrelated in themselves, and in so far as it is a deduction the Dialectic is "necessary" in two senses. First, Hegel understands necessity in the sense of a purely logical necessity whereby one determination is implied in the other, as when rational is implied in the concept of man or being in the concept of non-being. Expressed in Aristotelian terms, this sense of "necessary" means merely being "per se" in the first and second senses of saying "per se" in the Posterior Analytics. Each category by itself is no more than a partial thought which cannot exhaust the totality of the universe. In the Dialectic the deduction is supposed to show that these partial thoughts are taken to be so interwoven that all the categories imply each other and thus join together to form one per se whole or the Absolute. Hegel conceives this Absolute much on the order of Spinoza's Substantia, except that for Hegel the whole or Absolute is not, as it was for Spinoza, the immobile, undetermined recipient of determinations, but Subjekt, that is, knowing subject which is self-determining through the categories.

Necessity, of course, implies its opposite, contingency. For Hegel contingency means much the same it did for Kant. Hegel explains the German contingency (Zufälligkeit)

by another German compound, Auseinandersein, that is, "being outside of" or extraneity as when two things are together in a purely accidental way, as precisely not implying each other in their concepts. For Kant the sensible qualities were outside each other, both in so far as one did not imply the other in its concept and in so far as they were outside each other in space and time. The necessity which Kant sought was simply "implied-ness" in concept. This he found in a series of so-called logical relations such as cause and effect, substance and accident, etc. which he derived in a certain fashion from transcendental apperception or consciousness of self. However, Kant did not derive one set of relations from another nor show their interconnection. His deduction of the Categories in the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft was merely a justification of these concepts. This means that he showed they were properly used only in elaborating sense-perception. Hence, since the Kantian Categories were not inter-connected they were outside each other or contingent, and this is the principal accusation which Hegel brought against Kant. Naturally, since Hegel's aim is to show that all these seemingly scattered concepts are really inter-connected among themselves, the slightest contingency in the Dialectic would rend the Absolute and set up impassable chasms between the parts of the world.

The Dialectic, then, is necessary. The primary sense of "necessary" for Hegel is that meaning essential inter-connectedness, but one must not forget that in Hegel's mind there is always another sense of necessary lurking under the cover of essential connection of concepts. This secondary sense of necessary is necessary in the sense of a driving force, an efficient necessity which "pushes" the Dialectic along. Of course, this coercion is not quite the same as violence coming from without, nor even an external mover, for it is an inner drive. What he means, as we shall see more clearly in the final chapter, is that if we abstract from all subjective decisions and allow reflection to look over our concepts, the concepts or thought-determinations will, of themselves, turn over into their opposites and produce more concrete thought determinations all with perfect objectivity. The "coercive" necessity of Hegel is thus more comparable to syllogistic necessity in Aristotle. For Aristotle, implied-ness in concept and coercion are two distinct senses of "necessary" but in Hegel they fall together due to his identification of the way things are in the mind with the way they are in reality. This is based primarily on his doctrine of Heinung which we described in the preceding chapter and on the rejection of the "undetermined" as such.

Our problem can now be stated quite simply. The identity of being and non-being in Werden is unstable. Hence, it turns over into Dasein, "being-there" literally, or determinate being. But reflection discovers the opposite of determinate being, namely, determinate non-being or what we might call "being other" (Anderssein). Anderssein is in turn joined to Dasein or determinate being, and forms a notion or a particular Werden, namely, Veränderung or "becoming other". The point is simply that this happens in each triad in exactly the same way for exactly the same reasons, as we have indicated above. The only difference in the triads is that the particular thought determinations are more or less concrete and therefore have different names and correspond to different concrete pictures in Vorstellung or representation. There are gaps in Vorstellung and Vorstellung is admittedly defective in Hegel's view. Although the Dialectic is illustrated, to use a Hegelian term, (1) in Vorstellung, it is not derived from Vorstellung, nor is it in any way dependent on Vorstellung. Vorstellung does not prove the deduction of the categories, nor does a destruction of the Vorstellung necessarily destroy the Dialectic. Thus the question we are raising can only be studied by rigorously deducing the categories according to Hegel's own method and the

1 of. Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, B 126 (A 94) "Die Entwicklung der Erfahrung aber, worin sie (d. h., die Begriffe oder Kategorien) angetroffen werden, ist nicht ihre Deduktion, (sondern Illustration,) weil sie dabei doch nur zufällig sein wurden."

principles we have exposed in the first two chapters. In order to keep our exposition from becoming too involved and unwieldy, we must content ourselves with an exhaustive study of only the first two triads of the Logic, Sein and Dassein and their respective motions, Werden and Veranderung.

First, we shall study the question of motion of motion in Aristotle and then return, in our last chapter, to the explicit deduction of the categories of Dassein, wherein we shall be able to judge the intrinsic value of the Dialectic as Hegel understands it.